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**HOW TO BE SANGUINE IN SARAJEVO: LEADERSHIP** **AS TRANSFORMATION OR TRAGEDY?**
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Not all successful leadership is good leadership. As Peter Drucker once
remarked, the 20th century produced three great leaders: Hitler, Stalin
and Mao. Conversely, many leaders who fail to achieve their aims
nonetheless deserve respect and praise. In fact we can probably learn
more about how to do good by studying those who struggle for it in
almost impossible circumstances. This is what we had in mind when we
first took a group of company executives to Sarajevo in 1996, shortly
after the signing the cease-fire known as the Dayton Accord. The
context was a short course on leadership of change and continuity,
conceived by one of the authors, co-ordinated by the other and
commissioned by British Aerospace plc (now BAE Systems plc). Our aim
was to study what happens when ‘transformation’ becomes an
overwhelming reality. We learned a good deal about change, continuity
and leadership; but we learned more about this radical approach to
management education, which is the focus of this paper.

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We offer as a case-study one particular encounter drawn from over 10
years of engagement. In summer of 2004 three former Prime Ministers of
Bosnia-Herzegovina met with a group of senior executives (mainly British
and American) to reflect on this particular leadership role. The paper
explores both the content and process of this 'event', with commentary
on: a) the role of the individual leader, illuminated by the fact that we
studied three people who have consecutively held the same post, within
and impacting on the 'same' context; b) the practice of reflection in this
particular setting; that is, how to be reflective and to draw lessons from
experiences riddled with the presence of evil; c) the design and ethics of
leadership development programmes in which the moral predicaments of
participants become the central topic.

We conclude that management education must be radically reconfigured
if it is to address greatness as well as effectiveness. The emancipatory
aims of so-called critical management education go some way to
addressing our concerns, but our own case presents us with grounds for
profound pessimism, in the light of which we find hope only in the
possible cathartic effects of confronting the tragic aspects of leadership
and change. We recommend leadership development and management
education that engages with these ethical realities.

**INTRODUCTION**

This paper is about an encounter between 3 former Prime-Ministers of Bosnia and a group ofsenior managers from a large British company. The meeting was part of a leadership development programme – the Strategic Leaders Programme – originally designed by one author (Gosling 1999) and now co-ordinated by the other (Gosling, Purg and Hawtin 2000). The programme as a whole aims to diversify and improve the quality of conversation amongst the senior cadre of the company, and to do so primarily through a series of one-week exercises each in a distinct ‘mindset’ (Gosling and Mintzberg, 2003, 2004). The fifth and final module focused on leading transformation, a task we conceptualised as the operation of ‘a catalytic mindset’. By ‘catalyst’ we mean “a temporary architecture which enables new realities to emerge”i. The module confronts people in positions of power (the participants) with a series of questions about their role and influence: what is it that enables transformation when complex social systems and organisations seem to be stuck; and equally, what can be done to enable cohesion and direction in the midst of change? So for this programme we are open-minded about the meaning of ‘leaders’ and ‘leadership’. On one hand we are working with people who are de facto leader of clearly defined organisations or functional operations within organisations; we are also talking about members of a more or less clearly delineated group who are collectively looked to for direction, and who carry some legal as well as moral responsibility for the actions of those who act upon that direction. More loosely, we are talking about people who are perceived by this particular community to be leaders – because they display certain actual and symbolic signs and behaviours, and are thought to control the motivation, allegiance, optimism etc. of others.

The particular encounter we describe below took place in the summer of 2004 in Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia i Herzegovina (BiH). This (along with Mostar and other towns in BiH) has been the site for this programme since 1996, selected partly for the example it provides of a place inwhich change at all levels has been catastrophic, and is yet the sustained focus of attention by virtually all citizens and social actors (corporations, public bodies, politicians). It is a place in which the much-vaunted ‘transformational leadership’ (Burns, 1978; Bass and Avolio, 1994) has had a major impact – BiH has given rise to more than its fair share of charismatic leaders – and yet it remains a place much in need of transformation in its infrastructure, social systems, and perhaps most of all, the social identities of its citizens (Jetten et al, 2006).

One of the authors (Purg) is very well connected in the region and is able to call upon key people for the kind of conversations and experiences intrinsic to this kind of leadership development. This resource should not be overlooked when we come to discuss the wider applicability of our approach.

**BACKGROUND**

BAE Systems is a large UK-based manufacturer of highly engineered defence systems – aeroplanes, ships, submarines, land vehicles, weapons, ordnance and communication and control systems. They employ of 120,000 people in 9 countries. But they depend on one main customer – the UK Ministry of Defence, and a few substantial long-term deals with other governments – notably the ‘Al-Yamama’ contract with Saudi Arabia. The company also owns 20% or Airbus, and employs 40,000 people in the USA mainly in joint ventures with Lockheed Martin, Boeing and others. In the mid 1990s the company launched the ‘Strategic Leaders Programme’ (SLP) aiming to improve the quality of conversation amongst the senior cadre, especially with regard to its strategic and outward-facing responsibilities. The programme was in its 5th iteration at the time of the incidents described in this paper. It consists of 5 one-week residential modules, each designed to instil a specific mindset (Gosling and Mintzberg, 2003); and located in various parts of the world consonant with the respective mindsets. ii This is all part of a more comprehensive leadership measurement and development system branded in the company as ‘Performance Centred Leadership’.

**THE CATALYTIC MINDSET AND THE IDEA OF CATALYTIC LEADERSHIP**

It is not hard to perceive what it might mean to behave catalytically, as defined here. As the programme introduction puts it: “Catalysts help break resistance to change, and they help create an environment in which change can occur” (Purg, 2004). There are many situations in which a manager, team member or consultant can manipulate relations in a way that might free people from preconceived ideas, repetitive patterns of behaviour, process-bound regulations, trenchant opinions or fearful, resentful or combative emotions. In so doing he or she is behaving catalytically – constructing a temporary ‘architecture’ of relationships such that new realities – new possibilities – can emerge. In this context, we are considering this to be a certain kind of leadership – by no means the sole preserve of those inhabiting formal leadership positions: many people have the opportunity to exercise this kind of influence. But note that we are avoiding a more old-fashioned notion of catalyst – that of an agent which causes others to change but is not altered itself. This might work fine in physical chemistry; but it is quite inadequate in a quantum view of the physical world, in which any entity is constructed, sustained and constantly altered in its relatedness with its context (in fact, it is inconceivable without ‘context’). The same can be said of organisations (Wheatley, 1999). Every role, and every subjective sense of identity, is intimately interdependent on every other. Indeed, even this image of discrete entities constantly changing in relation to each other may be too fixed. Some would argue that consciousness itself is an overflowing process in which the appearance of subjective identity, a sense of ‘self’, is a contingent confluence of forces, and that any organisational architecture is necessarily a temporary attempt to structure and direct such emergence (Wood, 2005). The metaphor of a catalytic leadership is neutral in relation to these differing perspectives on organisation (entities vs. process); for in either case our attention is drawn to what any of us might do to enable newness, emergence and creativity.

Can we distinguish kinds of change towards which a catalytic approach is most appropriate? We imply above that there are circumstances characterised by ‘stuck-ness’ calling for freeing-up, a loosening of atrophy, prejudice, habit, inflexibility and so forth. These are features all too common in organisational life, often resolved by a re-organisation with or without facilitation by external consultants. But there are also circumstances of extreme fluidity, of almost perpetual flux,  stretching to breaking point the plausibility of transition from one stable state to another. Many might argue that most organisational life – especially in globalised digital industries – is now in this state of constant emergence, in which no trend is definite, concrescent or enduring. We are sceptical of this extreme view at least as an empirical description: we see much that sustains, continues and endures. But there are circumstances where, as WB Yeats puts it, “The centre cannot hold … things fall apart” (1921/1994). In such circumstances leadership may be sought from almost any sources which promise some form of coalescence – and all too often this is around an in-group identity; in the Balkans, post-Tito, the predominant leaders were those asserting ethnic and national identities. Milosevi􀃼, Mladi􀃼, Karadi􀃼 and others might well be seen to have played catalytic roles in the years following the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. Our aim in visiting Sarajevo was to ask if there might be some other form of catalytic intervention, some kind of leadership which could enable the emergence of a more sane, pluralistic and secular form of social identity. This is worthwhile, we felt, to understanding more than the Balkans; need a company, any more than a country, be crucially dependent on charismatic, opinionated and perhaps brutal managers to drive change? Could organised re-construction be accomplished without destructive in-group/out-group dynamics? And in relation to leadership and organisation studies more broadly, what should we look for as leadership, if not the presence and acts of charismatic individuals?

We determined to do this by enquiring into the experience of people who have filled a specific role of formal authority, to whom these questions must have been quite pertinent: three former Prime Ministers of Bosnia. The next section of the paper describes our interaction with them an offers some interpretation.

**MEETINGS WITH PRIME MINISTERS**

It is important to picture the context of these meetings. A group of 10-15 business executives, somewhat used to traveling for business, and to negotiating with senior government and military officials in many parts of the world, are spending a week to enquire into how BiH is being run. At every turn they are confronted by the stark realities of a country recently embroiled in civil war, where peace is maintained largely by the presence of international peace-keeping forces, and which is nonetheless tangibly European, culturally familiar. Some of them remember the winter Olympics hosted here in 1984. They meet the theatre director Haris Pasovic, who staged the Sarajevo International Film Festival during the siege plans to bring his acclaimed production of Hamlet to London in 2006/7. They meet the heads of international agencies responsible for rebuilding roads, bridges, a police force, a judiciary; and all trying to work out how to award contracts fairly, how to select advisors where everyone has had to take sides, no one will be seen as neutral, no-one is without pain and injustice. They meet the heads of political and religious groups, the leaders of businesses trying to bring investment into their firms, and they talk aboutall this amongst themselves,

Back at home, these executives are responsible for billion dollar businesses, for acquiring,merging and right-sizing international operations. They are no strangers to organizational change, so they come into these conversations with the questions and insights of very experienced practitioners. Amongst all these encounters they meet up with the three former prime ministers. These are formal panel sessions prepared and chaired by Purg. Not all the PMs are there at the same time, though they are aware of each other’s involvement. They are given 10 minutes to present their reflections on holding this particular role, and then to respond to questions, more or less formally, as they wish. The next section of this paper will give a brief summary of their respective presentations and the tenor of the conversations.

The three former Prime Ministers were Hasan Muratovi􀃼, Haris Silajdži􀃼 and Zlatko Lagumdžija. All three served as Foreign Minister beforehand, and all three are University Professors, respected intellectuals and pro-European.

These leaders have worked in an unprecedented context:

a) Four years of the aggression supported and/or perpetuated by Serbia and Croatia (this includes the Serb concentration camps in Northern Bosnia, four years of the siege of Sarajevo, the massacre of about 8000 men in Srebrenica in 1996.

b) After the war, they had to work at various levels of government with some of the people directly or indirectly responsible for these crimes.

c) The Office of the High Representative of the UN (OHR) both helped and hindered their leadership, as this agency itself became the site of wider east-west political struggles.

d) Radovan Karadži􀃼, who is still at large 12 years after the Dayton Agreement, heavily influences Serb politics in BiH. The International Community took until 2004 to take sanctions against his financial backers.

The war-crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, etc.), the organised criminal activity, the corruption, the abuses of human rights, the mistakes of the international community, the mistakes of the local politics - these are the features of the political context in which these leaders have operated. All this in a nation of 4.5 million people, in which many people know their political leaders by sight, and see them often enough in town.

Taking these in chronological order of their premierships, their stories are as follows. Each was asked for considered opinion on what is required for constructive transformation – what should a prime minister focus on? The comments and interpretations are drawn from discussions during the interviews and subsequent comments of staff and participants on the courseiii:

1. **Haris Silajdži**􀃼 was Foreign Minister (1990 – 1993) and Prime Minister from 1993-1996. He rose to prominence as he brought to public attention the massacres in the siege of Sarajevo (1992-1994), and was one of the chief architects of the ceasefire, which became the Dayton accord (1995).

The transition through which he served was not only in Bosnia; nor was it simply from oneeconomic system to another, from socialism to capitalism; but also from war to peace across an entire multi-national region. Thus he was involved in a period of multi-transformations, in which there were many problems to resolve and many competing priorities. At the same time the international community was a very significant, multi-faceted player – a loosely defined coalition that nonetheless managed at times to assert significant ideological and practical pressure on the situation. For Mr. Silajdži􀃼 the priority was to insist on building up the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he is credited with instituting the border service, non-ethnic courts and some fundamental laws.

His own account was as follows:

The way forward
Bosnia and Herzegovina can develop according to European standards only by punishing the war criminals and he believes that before anything is arranged in BiH it is necessary to resolve the basic paradox in this country: Miloševi􀃼 is being judged in the Hague as a war criminal; yet the outcome of his supposed crimes, the creation of the Republic of Srpska inside of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is protected by the international community, which is requesting the Bosnian community to respect the Republic of Srpska and everything around it!

Co-integration
Despite all of the problems we face, we are going into the direction of one legal state, which will function normally in the future within the frame of the European Union. We have to adopt the European standards and I am a Europhile, I am for the enlarged Europe. Competitive advantages of BiH were come to the surface on a larger scene. The local differences inside of BiH will become smaller and homogenisation will become bigger. I see the competitive advantage of BiH in the capacity of individual interaction, creativity, and feeling for improvisation. These qualities will come to the expression when people will not be afraid to play on the international stage - ethnocentrism is the result of the fear to exit your own circle.

My journey of self-development
I see a positive effect of my political engagement in condensed, intensive time when BiH was in the centre of attention and I had a duty to make good interaction with media, international organizations etc. This was a big opportunity for self-development and good interaction with International organisations in media. The negative side was the lack of time and political priorities, which were often of the completely existential character, and didn’t allow time for reading, discussions about culture, etc. Politics is not enriching you but eating the soul of a human being. If you are a public person than you are not yourself anymore. You belong to everybody; you have no time for friends and family. Sometimes my only wish was to have a good sleep and to digest the events. I was always functioning by priorities, which were war, peace and negotiations, question of life.

My biggest disappointment in the war was to realise that the human being was not evolving in the way I expected. After the Second World War I was sure that a similar thing would not repeat. I couldn’t understand the decision of the United Nations to forbid BiH from defending itself (embargo on buying the weapon). The most disappointing was a true difference of the International Community and of the Europeans, from whom we expected to stop the Fascism.

After the war I was disappointed by people who didn’t understand that in BiH the priority is to build a legal state and by the attitude of the international community towards building of the society and the state. They were perpetuating the situation that was established during the war. In the period from 1995 to 1999 many mistakes were made, which have to be corrected now (first privatisations which were concerning the results of the misuse of power, the ethnical privatisation and as a result it came to big ethnical hierarchy.

It is normal for the human nature that, in the period after a big cataclysm and all possible transitions, it comes to the phenomenon of people turning more towards themselves. Altruism was lost to a big extent. The phase, which we are undergoing, now is a phase of social stratification – formation of the new classes.

Looking back
I am deeply disappointed about the situation in the world, where philosophy of domination, the so-called vertical philosophy dominates, but on the other hand we have a process of intensive interaction between the individuals. In horizontal distribution, more people are participating in the decision-making processes. There is a need for a new humanism. And the vertical dimension is a use of power (force). I discovered the talent of communication with media, which was one of the basic needs for the country, which had neither international lobbyist nor the diplomacy. The negative side was the fact that I am not a politician. I only had principles behind which I firmly stand and I do not accept any compromises, any political incorrectness and I always have the tendency to swim against the current. I am pessimistic because I am disappointed about the fact that people do not want to have a better life. They are afraid of anything that is new in a traditional society. I regret the most that I continued to deal with the politics after the war in 1996, then we tarted to fight for something else than we did before.

Dr Silajdži is now Professor of History at the Faculty of Philosophy at Sarajevo University.

2. **Hasan Muratovi**was Prime Minister from 1996 – 1997, and then Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations to 1998.

He is described as a pragmatic economist; for him the priority was always to make deals to bring concrete change especially in the business sphere. He was prepared to compromise in order to get things to happen, and put significant effort into modernising his party and to change the approach to privatisation. He is perhaps the least concerned with his personal position: getting tangible results is his main concern; and he avoided grand gestures in favour of quietly making deals. His attachment to privatisation is in this sense not ideological: he just thinks it will be easier to make tangible progress. However success in this regard is hard to assess: unemployment is still growing and only some economic reforms succeeded.

Dr Muratovi is a Professor in the Faculties of Economics and of Electrical Engineering. He is a specialist in organization change, especially crisis management, and is currently Rector of Sarajevo University.

His own comments are as follows:

Reflecting about my work, skills, challenge, dilemmas
My big effort was to change the position towards privatisation. I believe that for myfunction of Prime Minister the most important was the application of communication skillsand the use of knowledge I have. I was known as a very good negotiator and I always, before any conversation and any negotiation, tried to find the theoretical basis. I never invented the arguments to achieve my goals; I always prepared myself on the basis of facts. So, the first high representative in BiH Mr Carl Bildt wrote that I was probably the only real negotiator in BiH. (I am now lecturing about the negotiations techniques in Postgraduate Studies of the Faculty of Economics, University of Sarajevo). I was leading the most difficult negotiations during the war with the Serbs under the auspices of the United Nations. I participated in seven governments in the period from 1992 to 1998. During that time I was a Minister in the government responsible for the relations with the UN and other international organisations, I was Minister for Economic Affairs, then Prime Minister and again Minister of Economic Affairs. During the war I was almost every day at the airport –the borderline with the Serbs, negotiating about water, electricity, prisoners, and I was preparing negotiations for Geneva.

Before that time I was never in politics and till 1999 I haven’t been member of any party. When I was asked to lead the election campaign for the Party for Democratic Action (SDA), then I also became their member. This party lost the elections in 2000 but I was leading the campaign for the elections in 2002 and the party returned to the government.

My journey of self-development
What did I get from my engagements in politics? If you are in politics, you give a lot and you lose a lot. I got the power, and I met many decision makers - through them I got the power, too. You do not have any influence if you are not in politics. Of course, many politicians are speculators and people are looking at all of us like that.

I was till recently one of the Vice Presidents of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, but I couldn’t do too much there, too, thus no challenge for me. I decided to return to Sarajevo in order to be a candidate for the President of Sarajevo University. I am interested in reforming the University, I have been working in this University for already 20 years and the Bologna Declaration can help in this process of reforming it. I believe namely that the development of the society very much depends on the production of knowledge and that’s why this job is for me a real challenge.

Which dilemmas have I been facing?
All politics is in fact a compromise. I never make compromises, which would threaten my goals. However, there is one compromise that I made and I am today very sorry for it. Immediately after the war in the phases of economic renewal of our country I was insisting that the priority should be given to the development of industry and out of that we could later finance the infrastructure. There was 5,1 billion USD available for emergency renewal (1996) and the European Union insisted on financing the infrastructure, the energy sector, telecommunications, transport, elementary and middle schools, etc and I gave up. The result is that today that we have high unemployment, some data show even the rate of 40% and I still regret I was not insisting even more on other priorities.

Looking back I am today happy and proud because I had, in such a difficult times, so much energy and that I was decisive concerning taking over the reasonability in risky situations. I am happy that I didn’t go to Dayton because I didn’t believe that anything
else than stopping the war would happen there. I had negotiations before with the leaders of Republika Srbska and I knew exactly what they wanted to reach there. None of the fundamental questions ware resolved with the Dayton agreement. Today I am neither reassured and nor calm. I think that in my life I made two fundamental mistakes. Firstly, I believed that after the Second World War there would never be any war anymore anywhere in the world and, secondly, that it would be impossible to privatise social property, to return from socialism to capitalism. I think today that this fast privatisation is very important but, unfortunately, the foreigners are planting in Bosnia the old fashioned models of privatisation. I also believe that market liberalisation can’t be the same as it is in USA and that we have to have in BiH the combination of the market economy with some good social policy, the reform that I call “Social Liberalism”.

P.S. The most difficult period was the first six months of occupation of Sarajevo by the Serbs and after six months my wife succeeded to buy three eggs at the market and than she came enthusiastically home and she said: Now I shall be able to cook for all three
days!

3. **Zlatko Lagumdžija** was Prime Minister in the most difficult period after the war (2001 – 2002) and Foreign Minister to 2003. Because of the new constitution imposed by the International Community’s High Representative, his mandate was only for two years; he had to be in alliance with many small parties, which was not the case with either Dr Silajdži􀃼 or Dr Muratovi􀃼. He thus had to coordinate many competing interests. During his tenure extraordinary events posed particularly difficult dilemmas: In the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Centre of September 11, 2001 he was obliged to hand over some Algerians who lived in BiH; this was publicly claimed by his opponents to be illegal act of government, and Lagumdžija’s domestic reputation was severely damaged for this concession. He also made several unpopular reforms, such as abolishing some veterans' benefits, under pressure from the International Community. He tackled the reform of making judicial system and Bosnian public TV independent from the government influence that proved to be a very problematic task. Nonetheless during his premiership many laws were passed that were good for EU association, and the Council of Ministers gained an important role in the country; thus the overall status of the civil governing bodies were significantly strengthened. In contrast to Dr Muratovi􀃼, he is more of an orator, stronger on the long-term vision (he is an advocate of stretch targets – “go for 110%”) and presents his policies in terms of their ideological and moral superiority; but perhaps less oriented towards short-term deals.

His own account of his tenure in the PM role is as follows:

Reflecting as a leader about my work, skills, challenge, dilemmas
As leader of the Social Democratic Party, he fought for a Civil Society in a united, modern, multiethnic and secular Bosnia and Herzegovina. As an expert in IT, he believed that high-tech modernity is the route to becoming an international European country.

Reflecting on the kind of leadership the country needs, my opinion is that Jack Welch would be better for Bosnia and Herzegovina than Vaclav Havel - because in this country one needs a lot of management of relationships and a lot of leadership skills in dealing with networks.

Looking back to my premiership: I wanted to make it clear that we are a reform party; I had a dilemma because of the two-years mandate; to show that you are a person of reforms and you risk to lose the elections, or you make compromises to get the timeframe of four years. Of course, I decided for the first. The transition in BiH was three-fold: three ethnical groups - transition in all three national entities and in each separately - I decided to stay consequent and was punished in 2002; but in 2005 people start to see better what my intentions were and I get higher ratings.

My journey of self-development and enlightenment
I believe that the most important is to appreciate yourself in the politics. You do not measure success with victory, but with the fight for the thing you believe in. The numbers and popularity should not obsess you and you have to accept that you do not have enough followers.

I am stubborn, I am resistant and my behaviour is not rational. However, my problem is, in fact my tragedy is, that I know what is rational.

For me the knowledge I possess was extremely useful, because I could see a big picture. The problem is that it is very difficult for public to identify itself with it. I am considered as arrogant, because they all know that I am a knowledgeable person. Some leaders look like their people look like, but I do not. My main decision stays, whom should I let to decide about the future of my child - somebody who is like me or somebody who is like you or who can create a better future.

The mistake I have done was explaining something that the others did not understand and I did not realize that people are lack some basic information. Thus in my communication I lack simplicity.

I have underestimated the inside communication in the party. When I became prime minister, I neglected this fact and I got the problem of fractions in the party and the lesson out of it is that I should not overstretch.

When I was prime minister I was also disappointed because we in fact did not have a real government, we had only ministers and I was the minister for foreign affairs also playing the role of the prime minister and I was disappointed to see that in fact it looked to the outside that I am the prime minister, but I did not have any legal mechanism to do something.

I made a mistake because I didn’t make enough publicity for the achievements as a Prime Minister. For instance we demobilized ten thousand soldiers and each of them got ten thousand marks of payment; this money came from the taxes and profit of public enterprises and the other; while the government before me demobilised 300 thousand soldiers and they got the certificates and these certificates have today the value of 3 per cent of what they got. Unfortunately, we were not able to communicate our achievement because of lack of time.
I am preparing myself for the elections in 2006 and I know that I shall win. I feel like I have a chance to do something in the second mandate. I wish to be PM only under the condition that I can do something. My motive is to achieve now what I couldn’t before and that is: firstly, to establish more production companies and not only trade which is the fact now; secondly, to stimulate to get a corridor through Bosnia and Herzegovina from Plo􀃾e to Brod. This project would be a very important project because of its multiple effects; and thirdly, to make constitutional reforms, so that the state would start to function normally again.

People who are thinking differently, people with vision

One has to have a vision, even in times when everything around you is falling apart. As the war was approaching its end Lagumdžija, at that time Professor of Computer base decision support systems, had the idea of founding an Information Technologies Centre. Although the city had no electricity, heating or water and people were concerned only with basic survival, he started to make plans for a modern IT department with satellite dishes and all the necessary equipment to study electronic decision-making. People around him, he suspects, helped him just because they felt sorry for him; not because they believed in the success of the Center. But his vision, enthusiasm and hard work resulted in a department that is one of the leading IT Centers in the country today.

The first lecture in the Center was in 1995 and 20 people who were even “crazier” than him applied to the degree course. Just a few weeks later the Dayton agreement was signed and a foreign journalist wanted to make an interview with Lagumdžija about his view on the agreement. The journalist did not like Zlatko’s office, so they went to the Center’s premises. When she entered she saw people on the executive development program “steering” Apollo 13 and someone up there in the sky had a problem, not them. It looked so strange that she said, “Forget about Dayton, can we make a story about this”. So the first story from Sarajevo was about people who are thinking differently. She told him later that she had not thought the country had a chance of survival but having seen those 20 people sitting behind a concrete wall were windows should have been and following an education course she realized that Bosnia and Herzegovina actually might have a chance.

Go for one hundred and ten
Through that experience, Lagumdžija realized that regardless of how deep the trouble one is in, regardless of how low one is, regardless how bad things look; and when chances of success are less than one in a billion; and if one’s quality of life is close to 0 on a scale of 0-100, and one is trying to crawl to 1, the only way to hit 3 or 5 or 7 is to go for 110. The only way to escape from the pit of misery is to go for 110. Of course the precondition for this is to know what 100 is - which sometimes is not so easy. (For him, “100” is for Bosnia to be the ‘Switzerland of the Balkans’.)

Bosnia decided to enter a bid to host the winter Olympics in 2010 and the Euro championship in football together with Croatia in 2008. They are aware that they might not get it in the first round, but one has to have high goals. If they do not succeed in 2010 they might do so in 2014 or later. In fact, winning the bids is not so relevant: what is important is that they go for it and that they get organized and set a goal that in 2008, together with their neighbor with whom they were practically at war, they could organise a Euro championship. The point is that they have to do so many things in order to be even considered a serious candidate; it would be a victory to fail because of bad luck and not because they would not be able to do it. After all, they ran the winter Olympics in 1984 and showed that they were really good at it. They would not want to get them on the basis of sympathy but because the world believes that they would be capable of organizing them. It is not only important to be good for those 15 days, he would like people to realize that they have to be and can be as good as those 15 days all the time.

Prof. Lagumdžija became a prominent member of the ‘Davos’ Economic Forum, and has returned to his Chairs in the Faculties of Economics and of Electrical Engineering at Sarajevo University.

**LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT**

This encounter illustrates a number of points about leadership development. Firstly, by meeting three people who have each served in the same role, but in differing circumstances, participants are led not so much to judge ‘who is the best leader’; rather, they are invited to appreciate how each person managed himself in that role. The emphasis shifts from what constitutes each of these real, present men as ‘leaders’ – especially given that none of them are any more in that particular premier role; we are obliged to look instead at how each of them took up that role. All too often meetings with leaders are presented as if the independent variable is person-as-leader. The interviewers seek to find out what it is about this person, which constitutes them as such; which features measure up to the mark of leadership. The specific features of the role, the context, the historical moment, are all pushed into the background; they become the backdrop against which the leader performs. But in the encounter described here, the historical context and the role of Prime minister are brought to the foreground. The purpose of the interviews is to discover how each of these individual went about filling that particular role – rather like how different actors interpret a leading role in a play.

This is significant, because much is written these days about how we must get away form considering leadership to be synonymous with the individuals in key jobs, or consisting of a list of qualities, which each individual satisfies to a greater or lesser degree. But in spite of the passion expressed by advocates of distributed leadership, team leadership or leaderful teams (etc.) (Raelin, 2003), developmental solutions seem to boil down to training individuals to behave more sensitively, to be more facilitative. The trainee for leadership is both the subject and object of the training: it is a matter of self-improvement. The encounter here is much less oriented towards personal reform. Rather, it is curious about how people as they are may act to fill, adapt and thus to realise a contextually-defined and authorised role.

Secondly, this programme reverses the standard modality of the case study. A case study is a carefully constructed narrative selected and presented to reinforce a pre-meditated teaching point. It is necessarily a simplification, and the pedagogic engagement is one that drives towards ‘the essentials’, which are general – or at least transferable - concepts. Crucially, it is designed to be presented to people who are not involved in the case-company, usually by teachers who also have little inside knowledge of the complex realities of that particular organisation. The SLP, on the other hand, reverses all these. The participants are deeply engrossed in BAE Systems, with the shared knowledge of its political as well as strategic character. In Sarajevo they confront a case that is certainly not simplified: in fact, their own problems may appear quite insignificant by comparison. On the other hand they may discover similarities (the company is going through post-merger integration, with noticeable lingering cultural identities). Perhaps there are analogies with the integration issues in BiH. And herein lies another important difference: faced with the tremendous challenges of Bosnia and Herzegovina, even the boldest corporate warrior must hesitate to offer solutions – in contrast to the students of classroom case-studies who are encouraged to prescribe for the companies they know through their few pages of study.

Finally, and to conclude this paper, we must admit that our initial hopes for the programme were only partially met. The three Prime Ministers were able to tell fascinating stories; they promoted the policies with which they wanted to be identified, they constructed apologies for the failures and shortcomings of their administrations, and offered explanations of the choices they made. Converting this into a more abstract and general conception of the leadership role as ‘architect of catalytic processes’ was the task of faculty. In our opinion this was only partially successful – for one significant reason: the overwhelming sense of pathos arising from these encounters was almost impossible to avoid. This sympathy with the tragedy of BiH has a prima facie significance; but it poses a challenge for the execution of the programme. If participants (and staff) are not to leave its theatre overcome with pity and fear, we must find some means for catharsis: a way to somehow reproduce the sense of hope and satisfaction, which accompanies tragedy in the theatre. This, it seems to us, is the substantial challenge posed by a leadership development programme, which has fundamentally instrumental aims – to improve the leadership of, in this case, BAE Systems. In exhibit 1 we describe three possible ideologies or ‘apologetics’ of management education; we were aiming for the second of these – an emancipation from habitual, blinkered perspectives and ways of relating. We should perhaps have prepared more assiduously for the third, the cathartic.

E**xhibit 1.
Source: Gosling, J. 2000 HRDI 3:2 pp. 143-145**

THREE APOLOGETICS OF MANAGEMENT EDUCATION:
UTILITY, EMANCIPATION AND CATHARSIS

Management education can be justified according to 3 ‘logics’ or apologetics:

1. Functional or utilitarian: it should help people to run their organisations more effectively; or it should help develop ‘better’ leaders.

Students should learn how to achieve business ends, how to perform technical functions, how to get on in life. What more they make of it is up to them; for example, if some of the ideas they come across are interesting, that’s an added but not necessary bonus. If they meet interesting people this is part of the programme in so far as it rebounds on the great sense of well-being associated with a the programme, but again is not an essential part of it.

2. Explanatory or emancipatory: it should explain the way things are in life, and in particular in systems that need to be managed. The purpose is to find out the truth, perhaps to be critical of received theories, and thus to arrive at a deeper understanding of the underlying relations of power (for example) in which management is enacted. The moral injunction here is to liberate oneself from false theories and ideologies; improvements to one’s managerial performance will be the result of a more rounded, reflective, modest and complex consideration of situations that are perceived as intrinsically problematic. This may relate to practical questions such as “what are our core competencies, and how do they relate to our professional identities?” More basic questions may also arise about efficiency and effectiveness; value, wealth and progress; purpose, accountability and legitimacy. The point of education, in this rationale, is to explain or uncover the arguments and their rhetorical constructions in order to ‘emancipate’ the student. The problem is – liberate to what? Education does not consist simply of an intellectual emancipation, a theoretical fluency unrelated to subjective life.

3. Cathartic: The process of education (literally ‘ideas drawn out from the Soul’ – e+ducare) leaves one with a sense of being part of a moral order that is essentially ‘just’. Sympathy with the tragic predicaments of those with greatness, yet flawed in very human ways, produces not merely cynicism or depression; but a sense of value in striving for good. The ‘order of things’ is not indifferent to good or evil: it contains both, and human activity – essentially the sacrifice of human greatness – is the means for the (continuous and temporally uncertain) overthrow of evil and the triumph of good.

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i We are grateful to Geraldine Kenny-Wallace for this definition. Professor Kenny-Wallace is a Professor of Chemistry, and was founding Director of BAE Virtual University,.

ii The 5 modules, mindsets and locations are:

1. Leading oneself: the Receptive mindset – UK

2. Leading the company: the Reflective mindset– India

3. Leading in the market: the Competitive mindset – USA

4. Leading Partnerships: the Collaborative mindset – China

5. Leading Transformation: the Catalytic mindset – Bosnia and Slovenia

iii We are particularly grateful for the considered comments of Haris Pašovi􀃼, Professor at the

Academy of Film and Theatre in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.